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Background: Misplaced or poorly calibrated confidence in healthcare professionals’ judgments compromises the
quality of health care. Using higher fidelity clinical simulations to elicit clinicians’ confidence 'calibration'
(i.e. overconfidence or underconfidence) in more realistic settings is a promising but underutilized tactic. In this
study we examine nurses’ calibration of confidence with judgment accuracy for critical event risk assessment
judgments in a high fidelity simulated clinical environment. The study also explores the effects of clinical
experience, task difficulty and time pressure on the relationship between confidence and accuracy.
Methods: 63 student and 34 experienced nurses made dichotomous risk assessments on 25 scenarios simulated in
a high fidelity clinical environment. Each nurse also assigned a score (0–100) reflecting the level of confidence in
their judgments. Scenarios were derived from real patient cases and classified as easy or difficult judgment tasks.
Nurses made half of their judgments under time pressure. Confidence calibration statistics were calculated and
calibration curves generated.
Results: Nurse students were underconfident (mean over/underconfidence score −1.05) and experienced nurses
overconfident (mean over/underconfidence score 6.56), P = 0.01. No significant differences in calibration and
resolution were found between the two groups (P = 0.80 and P = 0.51, respectively). There was a significant
interaction between time pressure and task difficulty on confidence (P = 0.008); time pressure increased confidence
in easy cases but reduced confidence in difficult cases. Time pressure had no effect on confidence or accuracy.
Judgment task difficulty impacted significantly on nurses’ judgmental accuracy and confidence. A 'hard-easy' effect
was observed: nurses were overconfident in difficult judgments and underconfident in easy judgments.
Conclusion: Nurses were poorly calibrated when making risk assessment judgments in a high fidelity simulated
setting. Nurses with more experience tended toward overconfidence. Whilst time pressure had little effect on
calibration, nurses’ over/underconfidence varied significantly with the degree of task difficulty. More research is
required to identify strategies to minimize such cognitive biases.
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The ability of nurses (like all clinicians) to be appropri-
ately confident in their clinical judgments is an import-
ant part of safe and effective healthcare. Overconfidence
in judgments such as “critical event” (such as cardio pul-
monary arrest) risk assessment may result in delayed or
inappropriate interventions [1,2]. There is no reason to
suspect that nurses are immune to the over/under confi-
dence that afflicts all decision makers [3]. Judgment
overconfidence is a particularly important bias [4] in
healthcare as overconfident clinicians (erroneously in-
flating the probability of being correct) are less likely to
seek information that could increase the chances of a
correct clinical judgment [5]. The relationship between
confidence and judgment correctness is known as cali-
bration of confidence [6]. Confidence calibration studies
describe the degree of concordance between perceived
confidence in an event occurring and the probability of
its occurrence. Overconfidence occurs when perceived
confidence exceeds judgment correctness. Conversely,
underconfidence occurs when judgment performance
exceeds perceived confidence.
Overconfidence is a reasoning bias that is not always
mediated by clinical experience. Hausman et al. [7] found
experienced paediatric residents were more likely to be
overconfident; a finding corroborated by Friedman et al.
[8] with experienced residents faced with diagnostic judg-
ments. Similar findings have been seen in nurses [9,10].
Confidence in a judgment appears to be linked to the
perceived difficulty of a judgment [11-14]. The more diffi-
cult the task the greater the overconfidence, and the easier
the task the greater the underconfidence [3,15]. This pat-
tern is known as the ‘hard-easy effect’ [6]: participants are
underconfident for easy judgments and overconfident for
difficult judgments. This ‘hard-easy effect’, particularly
overconfidence in difficult judgments, may lead to prema-
turely ceasing clinical judgment reasoning, resulting in an
inappropriate clinical response or action. To the best of
our knowledge, the relationship between judgment task
difficulty and confidence calibration in clinicians has not
been the subject of previous research.
Time is a crucial factor when seeking to understand the
relationship between confidence and performance [16].
Judgment confidence tends to increase with the amount
of time available for the tasks [17,18], and decrease when
judgments are time pressured [19]. Of course, such confi-
dence may be misplaced when performance on a task is
examined; too much time spent on a task by an “expert”
may induce poorer performance than their average [20].
Nurses faced with assessing critical event risk do so under
time pressured conditions. A judgment or decision is
made by critical care nurses once every 30 seconds in an
average 8 hour shift [21]. So whilst it is reasonable to hy-
pothesise that time pressure will lead to underconfidencein nurses faced with critical event risk judgments, we
know very little about the effect of time pressure on confi-
dence calibration performance.
Aside from clinical experience, task difficulty and time
constraints, there are significant methodological chal-
lenges in seeking to examine the relationship between
confidence and judgment performance. One of the most
pertinent is the means by which judgments are elicited.
Many calibration studies use paper-based scenarios to
elicit clinicians’ judgment and confidence ratings. Paper-
based simulation is easy to administer but is limited by
its lack of face validity, a particularly important limita-
tion for generalising to clinical environments in which
clinical information is often perceptual. Using higher fi-
delity clinical simulation [22] to elicit confidence calibra-
tion performance in more “realistic” settings is a tactic
that is promising but underutilised. In this study we
aimed firstly to explore the potential for using high fidel-
ity clinical simulations to examine nurses’ confidence
calibration performance, and then to investigate the ef-
fect of clinical experience, task difficulty and time pres-
sure on nurses’ confidence calibration in this realistically
simulated situation.
Methods
Calibration statistics
A series of calibration statistics were calculated: a cali-
bration score, measures of over/underconfidence and
resolution. The calibration score is a weighted squared
deviation between the mean proportion of judgments
that are correct and the mean confidence rating asso-
ciated with each confidence category (see equation 1)
[3,6].
Equation 1: calibration statistic [12]
1
n
XJ
j¼1
nj pj  ejÞ2

where: (n) represents the total number of responses; (J)
represents the total number of confidence categories;
(nj) represents the number of responses in confidence
category (j); ( pj ) represents the mean confidence level
associated with category (j); and (ēj) represents the mean
proportion correct in each category (j).
Calibration score ranges from 0 (perfect calibration) to
1 (worst calibration). “Perfect” calibration is achieved
when the percentage correct is always the same as the
confidence level in the judgments assigned in each cat-
egory by individuals. In contrast, the worst calibration
score of 1.0 would be the result of a participant always
assigning a confidence score of 100 when their judg-
ments are incorrect, and assigning zero confidence when
their judgments are correct.
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lationship between confidence and accuracy. This score
quantifies the deviation between confidence and propor-
tion correct on the basis of the formula: (p – e); where: (p)
represents mean confidence rating; and (e) represents
mean proportion correct. A negative over/underconfidence
score denotes underconfidence and a positive score
denotes overconfidence.
The resolution score measures a person’s discrimin-
ation ability by evaluating how well judges use their con-
fidence ratings to differentiate correct from incorrect
responses. Resolution is a weighted squared deviation
between the mean proportion correct (ēj) for each confi-
dence category (e.g. 0.50-0.59, 0.60-0.69 and so on) and
the overall proportion correct (ē) at the whole group
level (see equation 2) [12].
Equation 2 Resolution [12]
1
n
XJ
j¼1
nj ej  eÞ2

The resolution score ranges from zero to knowledge
index ē(1− ē). The resolution score is therefore condi-
tional on the mean proportion correct. This implies that
the discrimination skills from two persons cannot be
meaningfully compared. A normalised resolution score
(NRS) is derived by adjusting for the knowledge index
(see equation 3) [23].
Equation 3 Normalised resolution [23]
NRS ¼ 1
n
XJ
j¼1
njðej  eÞ
2" #
=e 1 eð Þ
The normalised resolution score, which is independent
of mean proportion correct, provides a more robust
measure when comparing discrimination skills. Normal-
ised resolution scores range from 0 to 1. A higher score
is indicative of greater ability to differentiate correct
from incorrect responses. The resolution statistic helps
further decompose a participant’s judgmental achieve-
ment. For instance, if a participant always has a confi-
dence score of 100 on wrong judgments and has zero
confidence on correct judgments, the calibration score
would be terrible but the resolution score would be per-
fect. In this paper we report only the results for normal-
ised resolution scores.
Calibration curve analysis
We constructed calibration curves as another means of
examining the relationship between probability judg-
ments and confidence ratings. Each curve is derived by
plotting the proportion correct on the y axis against the
confidence rating on the x axis [15,24,25]. Plotting a
calibration curve requires the conversion of continuousconfidence data into ordinal categories (e.g. 0.50-0.59,
0.60-0.69 and so on). The mean proportion correct for
each response group is plotted against the corresponding
mean confidence rating for that confidence category. A
45 degree line indicates perfect calibration, with devia-
tions away from the 45 degree line indicating the degree
of miscalibration (overconfidence and underconfidence).
The lower the curve below the perfect calibration line
the greater the tendency towards overconfidence. Con-
versely, the higher the curve above the perfect calibra-
tion line the greater the underconfidence.
The participant sample
We sampled 34 experienced nurses from the population
of ward and critical care nurses in North Yorkshire and
63 2nd and 3rd year nurse students from the population
of undergraduate students from the University of York,
UK. Given the lower recruitment costs associated with
student nurses compared to experienced nurses, a ratio
of 2:1 for students versus experienced nurse was there-
fore used for the sample recruitment. Using modestly
unequal independent samples such as a ratio of 2:1 can
lead to substantial cost saving with only little comprom-
ising effect on statistical power [26]. A power analysis
was conducted to determine the sample size. This was
performed using the variable of judgment correctness
for each participant. Our sample gives 90% power to de-
tect a statistically significant difference of approximately
10% in judgment correctness (the correspondence of
participants’ judgments with the standard criteria) at 5%
significance level (two-sided) between experienced
nurses and students.
The clinical scenarios and judgment criteria
Twenty five scenarios were simulated using a high fidelity
mock up of an emergency admission hospital room. Sce-
narios were generated by randomly sampling patient cases
from a dataset of emergency admissions in one NHS
District General Hospital during March 2000 [27]. A simu-
lated patient was deemed to be ‘at risk’ if they died, were
admitted to Intensive Care or High Dependency Units, or
experienced cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
Scenarios were used to simulate the five information
cues important for critical event risk assessment: systolic
blood pressure, heart rate, respiratory rate, temperature
and level of consciousness [28]. All the cues in units were
presented in ‘natural units’ (i.e. as they would appear in
clinical practice) using a computerised patient simulator
(Laerdal ™SimMan, Stavanger, Norway, www.laerdal.com)
and vital signs monitor. Clinical simulation content was
approved by a critical care nurse with ten years of special-
ist experience as a ward sister in intensive care.
The 25 clinical scenarios were divided into two blocks:
scenarios (1–12) and scenarios (13–25). Nurses were placed
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20 seconds per scenario for a judgment. No time pressure
was placed on judgments made in the second block.
Judgment task difficulty
To investigate whether nurses’ confidence calibration
was affected by the ease or difficulty of the clinical judg-
ment task we explored the uncertainty associated with
each task. The judgment rule associated with each task
was, “if information values are above a clinically signifi-
cant threshold then classify as ‘at risk’ of a critical event”.
We used the Modified Early Warning Scoring system
(MEWs) [27] to convert the value of each piece of infor-
mation into a ‘score’ for each clinical cue (ranging from
0–3). The scores were then summed and the total
MEWs score calculated. A total MEWs score of greater
than five should, if the rule was being applied, have led
to a classification of ‘at risk’. Of course, the uncertain re-
lationship between clinical signs, symptoms and patient
outcomes meant that not every scenario (and associated
patient case) where the ‘patient’ was classed as ‘at risk’
led to a critical event. Those scenarios in which score
and patient outcome were unrelated were classed as dif-
ficult, and scenarios in which score was indicative of
patient outcome were classed as easier. Classifying sce-
narios into ‘easy’ or ‘difficult’ ones reflects the complex-
ity of these patient cases in practice. There were 8
difficult scenarios and 17 easier ones.
Data collection
After being exposed to each scenario in the high fidelity
simulation setting participants were asked to make a di-
chotomous judgment (yes/no: at risk of a critical event)
on a data collection sheet (see Additional file 1: Appendix)
and assign a level of confidence (0–100) to their judgment.
Both experienced nurses and students made 25 dichotom-
ous judgments on risk of acute deterioration on the same
25 simulated scenarios and assigned their confidence rat-
ings for each judgment.
Ethical approval
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the Health
Sciences Research Governance Committee at the University
of York, UK. A written informed consent for participation
in this study was obtained from each participant.Table 1 Demographic data of participants
Demographic characteristics E
Age (years) Mean (SD) 3
Clinical experience (years) Mean (SD) 1
Gender n/(%) Male 5
Female 2
n/a: not applicable.Data analysis
Confidence calibration statistics were calculated for each
participant. For data appropriate for parametric statis-
tical tests, independent two sample t tests were used to
test for the significance of the difference of means in
calibration statistics between the two groups. For non
parametric data the Wilcoxon rank-sum test was used to
test the null hypothesis that the difference of the med-
ians for the calibration indices between the two groups
was zero. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to
test the mean difference between groups when more
than two independent variables were involved. Interac-
tions between independent variables were examined in
ANOVA. We used p < 0.05 as a cut off for statistical sig-
nificance. All analyses were performed using Stata ver-
sion 9 (http://www.stata.com/).
Confidence curves were plotted. To reduce any bias
in the curves, we did not plot data in which confi-
dence was less than 50 (7.51% of confidence ratings).
Because of very few data points associated with each
confidence category less than 50, deriving a curve
based on these very few data points would bias the
calibration curve.Results
Participants
Table 1 shows the demographic data of both experienced
nurses and student nurses.Proportion correct
In the high fidelity clinical simulation settings, no signifi-
cant differences in proportion correct were found between
the student (mean 73.7%; SD 6.88%) and experienced
nurse group (mean 73.5%; SD 9.08%), t (95) = 0.11,
P = 0.91. The ease or difficulty of the scenario exerted a
statistically significant effect (F (1, 289) =247.76, P < 0.001)
on the proportion of correct judgments. Time pressure
did not significantly alter the number of correct judgments
(F (1, 289) =0.00, P = 0.97). Similarly, the proportion cor-
rect did not significantly vary between each participant
(F (96, 289) =0.74, P = 0.96). No significant interaction
was observed between time pressure and easy/difficulty
of the scenarios on proportion correct (P= 0.59).xperienced nurses (n = 34) Student nurses (n = 63)
6.55 (9.96) 27.75(8.22)
2.15 (9.90) n/a
(15%) 7(11.1%)
8 (85%) 56(88.9%)
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Experienced nurses (mean 80.09; SD 10.47) were signifi-
cantly more confident than students (mean 72.66;
SD10.74), t (95) =−3.28, P = 0.001. Participants’ confi-
dence ratings varied significantly as a result of the diffi-
culty of the cases (F (1, 289) =133.94, P < 0.001) and
between participants (F (96, 289) = 7.70, P < 0.001).
Whilst time pressure had no significant effect on con-
fidence on its own (F (1, 289) = 1.78, P =0.18), there was
a significant interaction (P = 0.008) between time pres-
sure and the relative difficulty of the task on confidence.
Clearly, time pressure had different effects on confidence
for easy and difficult scenarios: time pressure increased
participants’ confidence for easy judgments whilst time
pressure decreased their confidence for difficult cases.
Under/overconfidence
Students were underconfident (mean over/underconfi-
dence score −1.05; SD 13.41) and experienced nurses
were overconfident (mean over/underconfidence score
6.56; SD 15.68), t (95) =−2.51, P = 0.01.
Calibration & resolution
Experienced nurses were no better calibrated (median
0.048) than students (median 0.048), z =−0.25, P = 0.80.
Similarly, students (median 0.198) and experienced
nurses (median 0.192) did not differ significantly in their
ability to discriminate between their correct and incor-
rect judgments, z = 0.67, P = 0.51.
Calibration curve analysis
Figure 1 shows the calibration curves for students and
experienced nurses in the high fidelity simulated situ-
ation. Both groups tended toward assigning confidence
ratings that were too extreme; a pattern labelled “over-
extremity” [24].
Figure 2 shows that time pressure had little effect on
participant calibration judgment. Figure 3 shows the
calibration curves of easy and difficult scenarios on noFigure 1 Calibration curves for student and experienced nurses.time pressure and time pressure, indicating that the
hard-easy effect was a distinctive phenomenon in the
high fidelity simulated situation.
Discussion
In capturing and reporting the less than optimal confi-
dence calibration of nurses and students, this study
offers both information (and a methodology) for those
developing high fidelity clinical simulations (particularly
for assessment of critical care events). In the high fidelity
clinical simulation environment, we observed a clear re-
lationship between nurses’ subjective confidence ratings
and accuracy in their risk assessments: experienced
nurses were generally overconfident, while student
nurses tended toward underconfidence. The difference
of this measure between the two groups was statistically
significant (p = 0.01). The findings showed that the sub-
jective probability judgments of experience nurses and
students were subject to systematic bias; either they
overestimated or underestimated their judgmental abil-
ities or knowledge of self judgment. Our findings repli-
cate the more general psychological picture that
suggests people (including decision makers with more
experience) are often systematically overconfident with
regard to judgment accuracy [6,24,29-34].
An appropriate level of confidence, given someone’s
clinical experience, is one marker of a nurse’s compe-
tency, and clinical experience is a significant factor in
building confidence in nurses’ judgment [9,35,36]. Our
study showed that experienced nurses were significantly
more confident in their judgments than students, and
that nurses’ confidence increased in line with clinical ex-
perience. However, we saw no significant benefit on
judgment accuracy arising from clinical experience on
judgment accuracy in the high fidelity clinical simulation
environment. Similar findings were also observed in
other studies. For instance, the study by Oskamp [37]
showed that experienced clinicians’ judgments were no
better than those of graduate students. A further study
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Figure 2 Calibration curves of no time pressure and time pressure for easy/difficult cases.
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accuracy of treatment plans developed by experienced
nurses compared with novice nurses. Hamers et al. [39]
also observed a similar level of assessment performance
in pain intensity between experienced and student
nurses. Ericsson et al. [40] demonstrated that a failure to
reliably isolate superior performance amongst nurses
with extensive years of experience appears to be a com-
mon trend. A similar pattern was observed in doctors;
the systematic review of effects of clinical experience on
medical performance showed a higher risk of providing
lower quality of care in doctors with more years of clin-
ical experience [41].
Given that nurses experience significant amounts of
audio and visual information (which is a mix of import-
ant signals and ‘noise’) in daily clinical activities, it is
reasonable to hypothesise that experienced nurses are
more likely to have better calibration performance than
student nurses in high fidelity simulated conditions.
However, our findings showed no significant difference
in calibration and resolution between experienced and
student nurses. Our study does not support the hypoth-
esis that confidence calibration performance is a linearfunction of clinical experience, even in the less than per-
fect environment of the high fidelity clinical simulation.Task difficulty and calibration
Our findings further reveal that nurses’ calibration dif-
fers with the difficulty of the judgment task they are
faced with. Nurses’ calibration and resolution were gen-
erally worse on the more difficult and uncertain tasks.
By varying the task difficulty, a hard-easy effect was
seen: nurses are overconfident in hard judgments and
underconfident in easy judgments.
Similar findings have been documented in psycho-
logical studies since the 1970s [3,11-14]. These studies
consistently conclude that the extent of miscalibration
relies on the degree of ease or difficulty of tasks: over-
confidence is most extreme in judges faced with tasks of
greater difficulty [6]. Lichtenstein et al. [6] note that the
hard-easy effect seems to arise from people’s inability to
appreciate the ease or difficulty of a task. Therefore,
nurses’ confidence miscalibration may reflect a lack of
sensitivity (and commensurate lack of subjective prob-
ability adjustment) to the difficulty of tasks.
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Figure 3 Calibration curves of easy and difficult judgments under no time pressure/time pressure.
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solve information altered as a result of task difficulty: their
ability to differentiate correct from incorrect judgments
decreased as task difficulty increased. This is also consist-
ent with the psychological literature [42-44] showing that
resolution is often better in easier judgments. Similarly,
the nurses’ discrimination abilities differed drastically be-
tween easy and difficult tasks; with discrimination fairly
good on easy tasks, but deteriorating as tasks become
more difficult. The strikingly different calibration curves
for the two levels of task difficulty (Figure 3a and 3b) may
result from nurses’ not really “knowing” their judgments,
particularly in difficult cases.
Time pressure and calibration
Time pressure had no significant impact on nurses’ con-
fidence, the percentage of correct judgments or their
overall calibration. This finding runs counter to those
studies [17-19], showing that decision makers’ confi-
dence lessens under time pressure and tends to increase
with the amount of time spent on tasks. One plausible
explanation for this finding is that nurses may experi-
ence a “mild” state of time pressure that does not neces-
sarily reduce their confidence. Thus, without sacrificing
confidence and accuracy, nurses adapt well to this state
of time pressure by accelerating information processingunder time constraints. This is in line with the thesis
that humans think “adaptively” in situations in which
resources are limited [20].
Time pressure increased nurses’ confidence in easy
cases and reduced nurses’ confidence in the difficult
ones. Such a significant interaction revealed that time
pressure had a different effect on confidence between
easy and difficult judgments. This phenomenon could be
partially explained by “the need for closure” effect [45].
Need for closure refers to a need for certainty, it arises
from the impact of time pressure on participants’ motiv-
ation and confidence [46-48]. Particularly, when an im-
mediate judgment must be made within a limited time,
the need for closure motivates participants to consider
fewer hypotheses and be more confident in their
favoured hypothesis. Thus, the raised confidence is
highly correlated with the (perceived) need for closure.
In contrast, without the need for closure (i.e. no time
pressure), nurses would tend to seek more information
in information processing with a number of competing
hypotheses considered, thereby reducing their confi-
dence in any hypothesis. These studies, however, did not
differentiate the effect of need for closure on easy and
difficult cases. In this study, the need for closure under
time pressure significantly impacts on easy judgments in
the form of increased confidence. However, the inverse
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ficult tasks suggests that it acts differently in difficult
judgment situations.
Recent evidence has shown a significant interaction
between the need for closure, judgmental performance
and changing judgment task demands (for example,
altered task difficulty) [46]. Roets et al. [46] suggest that
once tasks are perceived as difficult, willingness to invest
effort is reduced, even though the task demands are high
with an initial high level of motivation arising from the
need for closure. The feeling of investing a great deal of
cognitive effort in difficult tasks in a judgment process
can decrease the level of confidence [49,50]. Further-
more, others have shown that task difficulty has a signifi-
cant influence on judgmental response times: response
time increases as judgment difficulty increases [12]. Thus
response time is often required to be longer in difficult
judgments than easy judgments. Our findings suggest that,
due to minimising cognitive efforts for difficult judgments
under time pressure, it is reasonable that nurses corres-
pondingly assign lower confidence to difficult judgments
that require more cognitive efforts when the response time
is decreased.
Limitations
A non-random sampling method to enrol nurse partici-
pants was a limiting feature of the study. Whilst deliber-
ately sampling experienced and inexperienced nurses
allowed us to investigate the mediating effect of clinical
experience on confidence calibration, we could have
increased the risk of non-representativeness within sub-
group samples. Furthermore, the focus on judgment task
of risk assessments in acute care means that the general-
isation of the findings to other settings is limited.
Further research is required to establish whether the pat-
terns of confidence miscalibration observed in this study
are replicated in different clinical contexts.
Conclusions
Nurses were miscalibrated when matching judgment
confidence to judgment performance in a high fidelity
simulated environment. Simply being clinically experi-
enced did not help: it just increased the probability of
being overconfident. The study revealed that time pres-
sure is an important influence in nurses’ judgments; as
time pressure increased – for easier cases so did nurses’
confidence. However increased time pressure led to
reduced nurses’ confidence in difficult cases. While time
pressure had little effect on nurses’ overall calibration,
the observed ‘hard-easy effect’ suggests that nurses’ con-
fidence miscalibration is contingent on task difficulty.
These findings highlight the need for nurses to recognise
the ‘uncertainty’ [51] associated with clinical judgments
they face if their clinical judgments are to be as good aspossible. Of course, describing limitations is only the
first step in designing effective interventions for mini-
mising nurses’ cognitive biases – interventions that as
yet are largely unevaluated.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Appendix. High fidelity clinical simulation scenario.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
HY and CT were responsible for the study conception and design. HY
performed the data collection. HY and MB performed the data analysis. HY
was responsible for the drafting the manuscript. HY, CT and MB made critical
revisions to the paper for important intellectual content. HY and MB
provided statistical expertise. All authors read and approved the final
manuscript.
Acknowledgment
We thank Dr C. P. Subbe for consenting to use his dataset in constructing
our high fidelity case scenarios. This study was funded by the Department of
Health Sciences of the University of York, United Kingdom.
Author details
1Centre for Reviews and Dissemination, University of York, York, YO10 5DD,
UK. 2Department of Health Sciences, University of York, York, UK.
Received: 2 May 2012 Accepted: 25 September 2012
Published: 3 October 2012
References
1. Gao H, McDonnell A, Harrison DA, Moore T, Adam S, Daly K, Esmonde L,
Goldhill DR, Parry GJ, Rashidian A, Subbe CP, Harvey S: Systematic review and
evaluation of physiological track and trigger warning systems for
identifying at-risk patients on the ward. Intensive Care Med 2007, 33:667–679.
2. Goldhill DR: The critically ill: Following your MEWS. QJM 2001, 94:507–510.
3. Lichenstein S, Fischhoff B: Do those who know more also know more
about how much they know? Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 1977,
20:159–183.
4. Tversky A, Kahneman D: Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and
biases. Science 1974, 185:1124–1131.
5. Mumpower JL, Stewart TR: Expert judgment and expert disagreement.
Think Reasoning 1996, 2:191–211.
6. Lichtenstein S, Fischhoff B, Phillips LD: Calibration of probabilities: the
state of the art to 1980. In Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and
biases. Edited by Kahneman D, Slovic P, Tverksy A. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; 1982:306–334.
7. Hausman CL, Weiss JC, Lawrence JS, Zeleznik C: Confidence weighted
answer technique in a group of pediatric residents. Med Teacher 1990,
12:163–168.
8. Friedman CP, Gatti GG, Franz TM, Murphy GC, Wolf FM, Heckerling PS, Fine
PL, Miller TM, Elstein AS: Do physicians know when their diagnoses are
correct? Implications for decision support and error reduction. J Gen
Intern Med 2005, 20:334–339.
9. McMurray A: Expertise in community health nursing. J Commun Health
Nurs 1992, 9:65–75.
10. Yang H, Thompson C: Nurses' risk assessment judgments: a confidence
calibration study. J Adv Nurs 2010, 66:2751–2760.
11. Suantak L, Bolger F, Ferrell WR: The hard-easy effect in subjective
probability calibration. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 1996, 67:201–221.
12. Petrusic WM, Baranski JV: Context, feedback, and the calibration and
resolution of confidence in perceptual judgments. Am J Psychol 1997,
110:543–575.
13. Baranski JV, Petrusic WM: On the calibration of knowledge and
perception. Can J Exp Psychol 1995, 49:397–407.
Yang et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making 2012, 12:113 Page 9 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/12/11314. Baranski JV, Petrusic WM: The calibration and resolution of confidence in
perceptual judgments. Percept Psychophys 1994, 55:412–428.
15. Soll JB: Determinants of overconfidence and miscalibration: the roles of
random error and ecological struture. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process
1996, 65:117–137.
16. Hamm RM, Dowie J, Elstein A: Clinical intuition and clinical analysis:
expertise and the cognitive continuum. In Professional Judgment: A Reader in
Clinical Decision Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998:78–105.
17. Baranski JV, Petrusic WM: Testing architectures of the decision-confidence
relation. Can J Exp Psychol 2001, 55:195–206.
18. Petrusic WM, Baranski JV: Judging confidence influences decision
processing in comparative judgments. Psychon Bull Rev 2002, 10:177–183.
19. Smith JF, Mitchell TR, Beach LR: A cost-benefit mechanism for selecting
problem-solving stratigies: some extensions and empirical tests.
Organ Behav Hum Perform 1982, 29:370–396.
20. Gigerenzer G: Gut feelings: the intelligence of the unconscious. London:
Viking; 2007.
21. Bucknall TK: Critical care nurse' decision-making activities in the natural
clinical setting. J Clin Nurs 2000, 9:25–35.
22. Lasater K: High-fidelity simulation and the development of clinical
judgment: students' experiences. J Nurs Educ 2005, 46:4.
23. Yaniv I, Yates JF, Smith JEK: Measures of discrimination skill in
probabilistic judgment. Psychol Bull 1991, 110:611–617.
24. Griffin D, Brenner L: Perspectives on probability judgment calibration.
In Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making. Edited by Koehler
DJ, Harvey N. Oxford: Blackwell Publication; 2004:177–199.
25. Keren G: Calibration and probability judgments: conceptual and
methodological issues. Acta Psychol 1991, 77:217–273.
26. Torgerson DJ, Campbell MK: Use of unequal randomisation to aid the
economic efficiency of clinical trials. BMJ 2000, 321:759.
27. Subbe CP, Kruger M, Rutherford P, Gemmel L: Validation of a modified
Early Warning Score in medical admissions. QJM 2001, 94:521–526.
28. National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence: Acutely ill patients in
hospital: recognition of and response to acute illness in adults in
hospital. 50 edition. In National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE): clinical guideline; 2007:1–107.
29. Allwood CM, Montgomery H: Response selection strategies and realism of
confidence judgments. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 1987, 39:365–383.
30. Arkes HR, Christensen C, Lai C, Blumer C: Two methods of reducing over-
confidence. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 1987, 39:133–144.
31. Ronis DL, Yates JF: Components of probability judgment accuracy:
individual consistency and effects of subject matter and assessment
method. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 1987, 40:193–218.
32. Klayman J, Soll JB, Gonzalez-Vallejo C: Overconfidence: it depends on
how, what, and whom you ask. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 1999,
79:216–247.
33. Brenner LA, Koehler DJ, Liberman V, Tversky A: Overconfidence in
probability and frequency judgments: a critical examination. Organ Behav
Hum Decis Process 1996, 65:212–219.
34. Yates JF, Lee J, Shinotsuka H: Beliefs about overconfidence, including its
cross-national variation. Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 1996, 65:138–147.
35. Haffer AG, Raingruber BJ: Discovering confidence in clinical reasoning and
critical thinking development in baccalaureat nursing students.
J Nurs Educ 1998, 37:61–70.
36. Crooks D, Carpio B, Brown B, Black M, O'Mara L, Noesgaard C: Development
of professional confidence by post diploma baccalaureate nursing
students. Nurse Educ Pract 2005, 5:360–367.
37. Oskamp S: Clinical judgment from the MMPI: simple or complex?
J Clin Psychol 1967, 23(4):411–415.
38. Corcoran SA: Task complexity and nursing expertise as factors in decision
making. Nurs Res 1986, 35:107–112.
39. Hamers JP, Van den Hout MA, Halfens RJ, Abu-Saad HH, Heijltjes AE:
Differences in pain assessment and decisions regarding the
administration of analgesics between novices, intermediates and experts
in pediatric nursing. Int J Nurs Stud 1997, 34:325–334.
40. Ericsson KA, Whyte JI, Ward P: Expert performance in nursing: reviewing
research on expertise in nursing within the framework of the expert-
performance approach. Adv Nurs Sci 2007, 30:E58–E71.
41. Choudhry NK, Fletcher RH, Soumerai SB: Systematic review: the
relationship between clinical experience and quality of health care.
Ann Intern Med 2005, 142:273.42. Lichtenstein S, Fischhoff B: Training for calibration. Organ Behav Hum
Perform 1980, 26:149–171.
43. Bjorkman M: Knowledge, calibration, and resolution: A linear model.
Organ Behav Hum Decis Process 1992, 51:1–21.
44. Schneider SL: Item difficulty, discrimination, and the confidence-
frequency effect in a categorical judgment task. Organ Behav Hum Decis
Process 1995, 61:148–167.
45. Mckay R, Langdon R, Coltheart M: Need for closure, jumping to
conclusions, and decisiveness in delusion-prone individuals. J Nerv Ment
Dis 2006, 194:422–426.
46. Roets A, Hiel AV, Cornelis L, Soetens B: Determinants of task performance
and invested effect: a need for closure by relative cognitive capacity
interaction analysis. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 2008, 34:779–793.
47. Kruglanski AW, Webster DM: Motivated closing of the mind: "seizing"
and "freezing". Psychol Rev 1996, 103:263–283.
48. Mayseless O, Kruglanski AW: What makes you so sure? Effects of
epistemic motivations on judgmental confidence. Organ Behav Hum Decis
Process 1987, 39:162–183.
49. Zakay D: Post-decisional confidence - can it be trusted? In Decision
making: cognitive models and explanations. Edited by Ranyard R. London:
Routledge; 1997:233–247.
50. Zakay D, Tsal Y: The impact of using forced decision-making strategies on
post-decisional confidence. J Behav Decis Mak 1993, 6:53–68.
51. Eddy DM: Variation in physician practice: the role of uncertainty.
In Professional judgment: a reader in clinical decision making. Edited by
Dowie EJ, Elstein A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1988.
doi:10.1186/1472-6947-12-113
Cite this article as: Yang et al.: The effect of clinical experience,
judgment task difficulty and time pressure on nurses’ confidence
calibration in a high fidelity clinical simulation. BMC Medical Informatics
and Decision Making 2012 12:113.Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
